DRAFT — technical preparatory document, NOT legal advice. To be validated by a qualified lawyer before any use. Draft privacy notice. The controller (= the Client), the DPO, the legal bases and the transfers are to be confirmed with a qualified lawyer. Do not use before validation. Document prepared for JURA Club (owning company: QUANTANA S.R.L., data controller); to be validated by a qualified lawyer before any use. The external technical supplier(s) act as processor(s) under Art. 28 for the processing carried out on behalf of the Client only (development/hosting/maintenance), to be governed by a DPA. Version: v0.5 · Date: 2026-08-20 · Status: internal DRAFT ⚠ English translation of the Italian original, produced on 2026-09-21. The authoritative text is the Italian one (
03_Privacy_Policy.md): where the two diverge, the Italian prevails. This translation has not been reviewed by a qualified lawyer either. What is new in v0.5: D-165 has been taken up. It is the most favourable update in the whole corpus from a GDPR standpoint: the title no longer resides on a public chain, so no address attributable to a data subject is written immutably on a public network. Both open points from v0.2 change sign — see the box in §3. In exchange a new point arises: the register is kept by the data controller, and this must be declared rather than presented as an advantage and nothing more.
03 · Privacy Policy (GDPR) — JURA Club
1. Data controller
Data controller: QUANTANA S.R.L. (company name, registered office/State, contact details, certified e-mail), operator and owner of the JURA Club platform.
⚖️ To be defined/confirmed by the Client: any joint controllers and the DPO (Art. 37, to be assessed: large-scale processing of identity data). An EU representative under Art. 27 is not required, because the controller is established in Italy.
Processor (Art. 28): the external technical supplier(s) (processor under Art. 28), to be governed by a DPA, for the processing carried out on behalf of the Client only (development, hosting, maintenance). The external technical supplier is not a controller.
2. Categories of data processed
| Category | Examples | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Identity data (KYC) | Name, identity document, personal details, identity verification | Onboarding (mandatory for everyone, D-010) |
| Wallet data | Holder address in the Register, JUS balances, transaction history | Platform / private Register |
| Document file data | Documents, deeds, appraisals (possibly personal data of third parties) | Creator upload, encrypted off-chain |
| Technical data / logs | Access logs, audit trail, time-limited grants | Use of the Platform |
Note on the holder address: although pseudonymous, when linked to the KYC identity it is personal data. It resides in the private Register kept by the data controller, not on a public chain: it can therefore be rectified and erased by ordinary means.
3. Separation of data and proof (technical design)
- Documents (with any personal data) reside off-chain only, in an AES-256-GCM encrypted vault (D-003/D-016).
- The Register on which the units exist and circulate is private, kept by the data controller.
- On the public chain only a fingerprint lives — the SHA-256 hash of the document (
docRef) and the fingerprint of each recorded operation: they do not reveal the content, they contain no addresses in clear, no balances and no identifiers, and they do not constitute personal data in clear. - Consequence: erasure takes place in the Register and in the vault; the public fingerprint remains but, stripped of the data, does not allow anything to be traced. ⚖️ Thesis to be validated legally (Art. 17 vs immutability).
EDPB Guidelines 02/2025 — blockchain and personal data (final version adopted on 7 July 2026).
Update of 2026-08-20 — both points left open in the previous version change sign, and it is worth explaining why. Until 19 August the title circulated on a public network: the holder address was written there in clear and could not be erased, and the choice of a public network had to be justified precisely where the guidelines invite the opposite. On 20 August the client resolved on a two-layer design: the units live in a private Register, and only the fingerprint of each operation goes on the public chain — no token, no balance, no address.
(a) The governance choice. The guidelines' invitation to prefer closed-governance solutions is now followed: the register holding the data is closed and under the control of the data controller. The public chain is no longer the place of the data, only the place of the proof. ⚖️ It remains to be justified in writing, in the DPIA, why a public-network component is nevertheless necessary — and the justification is that the external fingerprint is what makes the fidelity of the Register verifiable by third parties rather than entrusted to the controller's word: without it the closed register would protect erasure better and integrity worse.
(b) Validators and DLT providers. The point narrows but does not disappear: no personal data transits on the public chain, so validators do not process personal data on behalf of the controller. ⚖️ It remains to qualify whoever operates the infrastructure of the private Register, which does process personal data in full, and to govern that relationship with a DPA.
(c) The new point, which arises with this design and must be declared. The register of units is kept by the data controller itself. What is gained in the exercisability of rights — rectification and erasure become technically possible again — comes with the concentration of the data in a single entity, without the redundancy of a distributed network. ⚖️ The security, continuity and retention measures for the Register must be defined, together with the fate of the data should the activity cease.
⚖️ See question Q31 in
09_Pacchetto_Consegna_Legaleand row G12 of the checklist.
3-bis. Contact forms on the public website
Processing introduced on 8 August 2026, when the website stopped pointing to the certified e-mail address alone. Until then it did not exist: the decision not to have it was motivated precisely by the fact that a form collects personal data, and where those data end up must be decided before asking for them.
What is collected. Two forms — request for information and request to join. Fields: first and last name, e-mail address, organisation (optional), the capacity in which the person writes (second form only), message text. No other data: no telephone number is requested, no special category under Art. 9 is envisaged, and the data subject is warned not to include any.
Legal basis. Consent (Art. 6(1)(a)), given through a non-pre-ticked box linking to this notice. Consent is required in order to send: without it the form does not submit.
Purpose. To answer the request, and nothing else. The address is not used for promotional communications, is not transferred to third parties and does not feed any list.
Where the data end up. The message is composed and written to disk as an .eml file in a server spool, before delivery: if delivery fails, the message is not lost. The spool is excluded from the repository and contains personal data. ⚖️ Retention and erasure of the spool are to be defined and to be recorded in the register of processing activities (Art. 30).
What is NOT recorded. No form data reaches the application logs: what appears is that a message was composed, for which form and with which identifier — not who wrote it nor what it contains.
Measures adopted. Server-side validation; honeypot field and minimum completion time against automated submissions; submission limit per IP address; sanitisation of the message headers against recipient injection. The data subject's address is used as Reply-To and never as sender.
⚖️ To be defined by the Client: retention period for the messages, processor for the outgoing mail service (if external, DPA under Art. 28), and erasure procedure upon request.
4. Purposes and legal bases (Art. 6)
| Purpose | Legal basis (proposed) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Identity verification (KYC) | Legal obligation (AML) and/or performance of the contract | ⚖️ depends on the AML perimeter (checklist §2) |
| Issuing/managing JUS, adherence to duties | Performance of the contract | Privity/adherence |
| Security, audit, abuse prevention | Legitimate interest / legal obligation | Balancing test to be documented |
| Service communications | Performance of the contract | — |
| Marketing (if any) | Consent | Only if activated |
⚖️ Every legal basis must be confirmed by the lawyer; the list is preliminary.
5. Data retention
- KYC/AML data: retained for the period imposed by the applicable anti-money-laundering legislation (to be defined, typically 5–10 years).
- Logs and audit trail: the recorded AuditTrail is immutable, and its public fingerprint is definitively so; log retention is to be defined, reconciling immutability with the storage-limitation principle.
- Documents in the file: for the duration of the legal position plus statutory periods; then off-chain erasure.
6. Rights of the data subject (Arts. 15–22)
Access, rectification, erasure, restriction, objection, portability. Practical limits:
- Erasure: can be carried out in the Register and in the vault; the fingerprint written on the public chain cannot be erased but, stripped of the data, carries no intelligible content.
- Holder data in the Register: can be rectified and erased, because the Register is private and under the control of the data controller. ⚠ Until 19 August 2026 this was not the case: the address was written on a public chain and could not be erased. The limit fell away with the migration to the private Register, and this line records it so that a limit which no longer exists is not kept being declared.
⚖️ The notice must clearly explain these technical limits to the data subject, and must state what remains written on the public chain even after erasure — that is, the fingerprint, and nothing else.
7. Recipients and processors
- The external technical supplier(s) as processor under Art. 28 for development/hosting/maintenance; the KYC/AML provider, hosting/vault, custodial KMS, and any notary/partner (A5, to be defined) as further processors/sub-processors.
- The Client (controller) enters into an Art. 28 agreement (DPA) with each of them, including the one with the external technical supplier(s). ⚖️ To be prepared.
8. Transfers outside the EU
The controller is established in Italy: the GDPR applies directly and the relevant transfers are those outbound to third countries. In particular, the external technical supplier is established in San Marino, a third country with respect to the EU: for the data transferred there (development, hosting, maintenance) the basis for the transfer must be identified. ⚖️ To be defined: verify whether an adequacy decision applies to San Marino and, failing that, adopt standard contractual clauses (SCCs) with a transfer impact assessment; the same assessment applies to every other non-EU sub-processor.
9. Security measures
Encryption at rest (AES-256-GCM), anti-swap AAD bound to the docRef (D-017), access to documents only through revocable and traced time-limited grants, controlled admission and KYC. Key management via KMS/HSM in production (open item T-023).
⚠️ The private Register is a security measure and at the same time a concentration of risk. Because the units and the holder addresses reside in a register kept by the data controller, and not replicated across a network of third parties, the continuity, backup and retention measures for the Register are not an operational requirement but a safeguard of the data subjects' rights. ⚖️ To be defined, together with the fate of the Register should the activity cease.
10. Automated decision-making
The control of transfers (KYC/adherence) is based on deterministic rules applied by the Register. ⚖️ Assess whether this amounts to relevant automated processing under Art. 22.
⚠️ Legal checks required
- Controller (= the Client) / joint controllers, DPO, EU representative (Art. 27) on the Client's side — data missing, to be defined according to the Client's establishment.
- DPIA mandatory (large scale + innovative technology + identity data).
- Transfers to third countries (depending on the Client's establishment; in particular to the external technical supplier(s) established in a third country, e.g. San Marino, as processor/sub-processor): legal basis for the transfer.
- Qualification of the holder address as personal data and a dedicated notice.
- Reconciliation of Art. 17 (erasure) with the immutability of the public fingerprint: validate the thesis in §3/§6, now that the data are no longer on a public chain and the limit concerns the fingerprint alone.
- Content of the public fingerprint (§3): verify that, as built, it does not allow a third party to reconstruct who carried out which operation — not even by correlating successive fingerprints. It is the point on which the EDPB guidelines are most demanding, and the check is technical before it is legal.
- Private Register (§9): continuity, retention and the fate of the data upon cessation of the activity; qualification of the infrastructure operator and the related DPA.
- Retention of KYC/AML data and logs: exact durations.
- DPA which the Client (controller) enters into with every processor (external technical supplier(s), KYC, vault, KMS, notary).